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This study employed a stated choice experiment survey to identify southeastern
U.S. farmers’ preferences for contracts to produce Giant Miscanthus. We developed a
more theoretically consistent framework which takes into account risk preference and
perception information and also accounts for heterogeneous status-quo alternatives.
Results from our Random Parameter Logit model indicated that price per ton of
harvested Giant Miscanthus, biorefinery harvest, and establishment cost-share all had
significant positive effects on the probability of a producer accepting a contract to
produce Giant Miscanthus, whereas contract length had a significant negative effect.
Our analysis also found evidence of significant preference heterogeneity in
producers’ preferences for biorefinery harvest, yield insurance, and contract length. We
also found that incorporating risk perception and risk preference information, as well as
accounting for heterogeneous status-quo alternatives in the decision framework improved
overall model performance even though the respective individual coefficients for these
variables were not statistically significant.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Motivation and importance of the study
Unstable oil supply, fluctuating oil prices as well as ensuring energy security are
of major concerns for the U.S. government (Hamilton 2008; LeBlanc and Chinn 2004).
As such there have been increasing policy supports for the supply of alternative energy
sources such as ethanol (Brown and Huntington 2013). However, ethanol production in
the U.S is dominated by the use of corn which has generated debate about the possibility
of increased food prices (Runge and Sanauer 2007). In line with addressing these issues,
the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 mandates that by the year
2022, 21 billion gallons of ethanol be produced from cellulose annually.
Cellulosic ethanol is that ethanol obtained from sources such as switchgrass,
wood residues, and corn stover. There is evidence that cellulosic ethanol is both more
abundant and also more environmentally-friendly than grain-based fuels (Perrin et al.
2008), although there is debate as to whether the use of corn residues would result in
increased erosion problems (Petrolia 2008a). Cellulosic fuels would result in significant
reductions in green gas emissions relative to conventional fuels, although SOx emissions
would increase (Petrolia 2006).
To achieve the goal of producing 21billion gallons of cellulosic ethanol as
established by EISA, Giant Miscanthus has been identified as a high yielding bioenergy
1

crop compared to for instance switchgrass (Heaton, Voigt, and Long 2004). The grass is
cultivated from rhizomes and can reach a height of 8 to 12 feet. It takes 2 to 3 years to
reach full harvest potential. Once it is established, stands can remain on the field for an
average of 15 years without re-establishment or re-planting, requiring only fertilizer each
time it is harvested to replace nutrient loss (Heaton et al. 2010). Giant Miscanthus can
thrive on marginal lands which are not suitable for row crops such as corn, although
yields tend to lower on marginal soils (Heaton et al. 2010).
Field trials of Giant Miscanthus production across the United States have shown
that the grass can produce more biomass than traditional switchgrass varieties and Giant
Miscanthus yields observed in some parts of Europe (Khanna, Dhungana, and CliftonBrown 2008; Heaton , Dohleman, and Long 2008). However, despite all these potential
benefits, there are no existing markets for cellulosic energy feedstocks in the United
States. Okwo and Thomas (2014) pointed out that, farmers would not adopt the
production of new bioenergy crops unless they are guaranteed a market for their crop. In
the same way biorefinery firms will only come into existence unless they are guaranteed
reliable supply of cellulosic feedstock.
Due to the lack of a market for biofuel feedstocks in the U.S., as well as the
potential yield loss which could be associated with production of bioenergy feedstocks in
general, production of Giant Miscanthus could be considered as a risky enterprise. A
potential means to induce producers to grow bioenergy feedstocks is by offering
production contracts. However, although contracts can be used to encourage producers to
plant Giant Miscanthus, potential producers may not only be interested in contract
availability. Farmers will only produce Giant Miscanthus under contract only when they
2

see the overall value of the contract to be higher than the returns from their current crop
(Song, Zhoa, and Swinton 2011). As a result at the margin, particular contract attributes
are important.
The literature has shown that contract attributes which may be of interest to
farmers may include; contract length (i.e. which indicates the duration of the contract in
consecutive years), availability of yield insurance for purchase, biorefinery harvest (i.e.
an option which indicates that the biorefinery firm would carry out the harvesting of the
grass), and rhizome or establishment cost–share (Bergtold, Fewell, and Williams 2014).
Aside these attributes, another attribute which is considered important is the price to be
offered per ton of harvested Giant Miscanthus.
Analyzing effects of these contract attributes on farmers’ willingness to produce
Giant Miscanthus give an indication of producers’ preferred contracts. To our knowledge
issues of farmers risk perceptions and risk preferences are some factors which influence
an individual’s decision as empirically demonstrated by Petrolia et al. (2015), Petrolia,
Landry, and Coble (2013), and Lusk and Coble (2005). However, no research has been
conducted that addresses how these factors affect producers’ decisions of accepting
contracts to produce specifically Giant Miscanthus.
Past studies regarding cellulosic feedstock production were focused on the
feasibility (both economic and technical) and the potential supply of alternative sources
of cellulosic biofuel feedstock in the United States (e.g. Bangsund, DeVuyst, and
Leistritz 2008; Bruce et al. 2007; De La Torre Ugarte et al. 2007; Khanna, Dhungana,
and Clifton-Brown 2008; Perrin et al. 2008; Petrolia 2008b), with other work focusing on
consumer preferences for biofuels (e.g. Li and McCluskey 2014; Petrolia et al. 2010;
3

Skahan 2010; Solomon and Johnson 2009). For instance, Perrin et al. (2008) estimated
the cost of producing switchgrass in commercial quantities. Bruce et al. (2007) also
carried out a study similar to Perrin et al. (2008) by providing estimates of the costs
associated with the conversion of land for traditional crops production to the production
of switchgrass. Bergtold, Fewell, and Williams (2014) departed from estimating costs
associated with the production of bioenergy crops and employed survey methods to study
Kansas farmers’ willingness to produce alternative cellulosic biofuel feedstock under
alternative contractual, harvesting and market arrangements. Their study is similar to our
study. However, we improved upon their framework conceptually. They did not
incorporate risk preference and risk perception information in their utility framework.
Our study built upon previous work by focusing on Giant Miscanthus, which to
the best of our knowledge was the first of its kind. The study provided a stronger
conceptual framework for analyzing the producer decision of accepting bioenergy
feedstock contract. We also incorporated farmer risk preference and risk perception
information into the decision framework. The study also examined the existence of
preference heterogeneity in producers’ preferences for biorefinery harvest, yield
insurance, establishment cost–share, and contract length. Another unique contribution of
this research was how we specified the utility of the status-quo which allowed for
heterogeneous status-quo by utilizing net revenue and variance information from farmers’
current crop productions. Previous studies assumed a common status-quo of zero which
could be misleading since potential bioenergy crop producers are producers of different
crops and as such may have different net returns from their current crop production.

4

The research also provided estimates of the overall contract values necessary for
adoption, overall probabilities of contract acceptance and also provided estimates of the
incremental values of contract length, establishment cost-share, yield insurance
availability, and biorefinery harvest on biofuel contracts.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides information about Giant Miscanthus production and
summarizes previous research on farmers’ willingness to produce dedicated energy crops
as well as consumer preferences for biofuels.
Giant Miscanthus production
Giant Miscanthus is a perennial, warm-season bioenergy crop which is non-native
to U.S. This bioenergy grass is usually ready for harvest after 2 to 3 years of
establishment. A hybrid Giant Miscanthus known as “Freedom Giant Miscanthus” which
was developed at Mississippi State University is considered as the variety suitable for
U.S. southeast (MSU Extension Service 2012).
Studies conducted on Giant Miscanthus so far were concentrated on technical and
economic viability of producing the crop. Altman and Sanders (2012) posited that
feasibility studies show cellulosic ethanol could be feasible; however, the growth of the
biofuel industry has been limited. Khanna (2008) examined and compared the costs of
producing biofuels from the three bioenergy feedstocks namely; Giant Miscanthus, corn
stover, and switchgrass using field data from Illinois. Her estimates suggested that it is
expensive to produce cellulosic biofuels relative to grain based biofuels, but she argued
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that introduction of harvesting technologies, storage, etc. would render cellulosic biofuels
competitive.
Khanna, Dhungana, and Clifton-Brown (2008) found the breakeven delivered cost
of Giant Miscanthus for an average yield of 13.0 dry matter tons per acre in Illinois to be
less than two-thirds the breakeven price of switchgrass which had a yield of 3.4 dry
matter tons per acre on the average. Khanna et al.’s (2008) conclusion was that
traditional switchgrass yields would likely not be able to compete with Giant Miscanthus
yields.
Vyn, Virani, and Deen (2012) examined the economic feasibility of Giant
Miscanthus in Ontario, Canada. They determined the breakeven price of Giant
Miscanthus production in Ontario by using a net present value approach. Their estimated
breakeven price was found to be $88.0 per ton. When they applied their results to
Ontario’s greenhouse industry, the cost of energy derived from Giant Miscanthus was
found to be competitive with the costs of non-renewable energy sources that prevailed at
the time. However, they concluded that even though bioenergy grass like Giant
Miscanthus was economically feasible, its use for energy production depends largely on
farmers’ willingness to produce the grass.
Farmers’ willingness to grow dedicated energy crops
Jensen et al. (2007) used survey method to analyze Tennessee farmers’
willingness to produce switchgrass for energy production. Results from their study
showed that most farmers, at the time of the survey had still not heard of growing
switchgrass for energy production. About 30% of the respondents indicated they were
willing to produce switchgrass if it is profitable. The farmers aside expressing their
7

concerns about the market availability, they also pointed out that they would need
technical assistance.
Sherrington, Bartley, and Moran (2008) using focus group discussions affirmed
that farmers’ perception of financial returns and uncertainty in financial returns were the
main factors affecting adoption of energy crops production.
Qualls et al (2012) used a tobit (censured regression model) to analyze factors
affecting willingness to produce switchgrass in the southeastern U.S. Results from their
study revealed that about two – thirds of the producers in the region had some interest in
growing switchgrass. However their results indicated that producing a commodity under
contract did not have a significant marginal effect on producers’ interest in producing the
commodity.
Lynes et al. (2012) conducted in-person interviews from three different regions in
Kansas to examine producers’ willingness to harvest or grow bioenergy crop. They
reported that 44% of the people interviewed were willing to grow a perennial bioenergy
crop. Their results also indicated that farmers were willing to devote larger acreage of
their farm lands to the production of annual bioenergy crop than perennial bioenergy
crop. Their study revealed that farmers were willing to produce cellulosic bioenergy
crops under favorable contract conditions as a result they suggested that further studies
should be conducted to identify these favorable contract conditions.
Bergtold, Fewell, and Williams (2014) used choice experiment survey to examine
farmers’ willingness to produce alternative cellulosic biofuel feedstock under different
contractual, market, and harvesting agreements in Kansas. Results from their study
indicated that contract length, cost-share, financial incentives, and insurance are the most
8

likely contractual attributes which could increase the development of feedstock
enterprise. However their work concentrated on corn stover, sweet sorghum, and
switchgrass but not on Giant Miscanthus. Again they surveyed only Kansas farmers
hence their findings are likely not to reflect the views of farmers in Mississippi and North
Carolina. Even though some work have been conducted to examine farmers willingness
to produce dedicated energy crop in the U.S., little is known about southeastern farmers’
willingness to grow specifically, Giant Miscanthus under different contracts.
Gedikoglu (2012) used ordered probit regression to analyze socio-economic
factors that affect farmers’ willingness to produce both Giant Miscanthus and switchgrass
in Missouri and Iowa. Results from the study indicated that farmers with higher
education levels, smaller farm sales were more willing to grow bioenergy crops.
However, on the whole, level of farmers’ willingness to grow both Giant Miscanthus and
switchgrass were low. This study though examined farmers’ willingness to produce both
Giant Miscanthus and switchgrass, it focused on the influence of socio-economic factors.
The current study extended this body of literature by analyzing southeast farmers’
willingness to produce Giant Miscanthus given that markets exit to absorb their harvested
produce.
Consumer preferences for biofuels
In spite of the increasing policy support for the supply of biofuel feedstock by
producers, consumers’ preferences for these biofuels should not be neglected since
consumers are the end users of the product. Therefore it was prudent to look at studies
about biofuels from the demand side to be able to predict whether there would be a
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balance between demand and supply of biofuels. In light of this literature on consumer
preferences for biofuels was reviewed.
Petrolia et al. (2010) used contingent valuation survey to determine whether
Americans want ethanol. They reported that consumers overall perceptions of biofuels
were positive, however, they also identified that ethanol was not the globally preferred
transportation - energy alternative. Petrolia et al.’s (2010) final conclusion was that the
demand for E-85 (a fuel blend of 85% gasoline and 15% ethanol) was more price
inelastic compared with E-10 (a fuel blend of 90% gasoline and 10% ethanol).
Jensen et al. (2010) also used contingent choice survey to analyze consumer
willingness to pay for E-85 from corn, wood residues, and switchgrass. Their results
indicated that consumers were willing to pay a premium for E-85 from switchgrass
compared with E-10 from corn. However respondents’ familiarity with ethanol before
the survey was not significant. Their study also showed that females were more willing
to pay for E-85 than males regardless of feedstock from which the ethanol came from.
Furthermore, Ulmer et al. (2004) sampled 685 people in Oklahoma to determine
their acceptance of ethanol blended fuels. The researchers re-affirmed that about 58% of
the study participants believed that ethanol was better for the environment than gasoline;
about 63% of the survey respondents were willing to purchase ethanol-blended gasoline
if it was available. Ulmer et al. (2004) reiterated that consumers when deciding to
purchase ethanol-blended fuel, they put much importance on cost as compared to
environmental benefits and vehicle performance.
Aguilar and Thompson (2010) also used conjoint analysis of consumer
willingness to pay for ethanol blended fuels in Missouri. Results from their conditional
10

logistic regression model showed that price was the main factor behind Missouri
consumers’ willingness to purchase ethanol blended fuel. Results from this study also
found that consumers were more likely to use E-10 fuel compared with E-20 fuel, ceteris
paribus.
Li and McCluskey (2014) used contingent valuation survey to identify
consumers’ willingness to pay for second-generation bioethanol (i.e. ethanol derived
from non-edible biomass sources such as Giant Miscanthus). The authors sampled
respondents from Portland, Oregon. Findings from their study indicated that consumers
were willing to pay a premium for second-generation bioethanol. Results from their
study suggested that about 79% of the respondents were willing to purchase the fuel at
the market price which existed at the time. The researchers also indicated that 91% of the
participants were willing to purchase the product if they were offered a discount.
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CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRAMEWOK

The chapter presents the theoretical framework which drives the study. It begins
with the mean - variance utility function and proceeds to random utility model. The
chapter also describes how risk information (risk preferences and perceptions) can be
incorporated into the random utility model.
Mean - variance utility
Following Spiegel’s presentation of Sargent’s (1987) original model, suppose the
utility from revenue, R, is given by:

U ( R)  e R ,   0

(3.1)

where  is the risk aversion coefficient.
Taking first and second derivatives of (3.1), we have:

U / ( R)   e R ,   0,

U // ( R)   e R

(3.2)

The results in (3.2) imply that utility is increasing and concave in revenue, R, where
concavity suggests risk aversion. Furthermore we can also note that the Arrow – Pratt
absolute risk aversion coefficient is given by:
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U / / ( R)
 /
 .
U ( R)

(3.3)

This suggests that the larger the value of  , the more risk averse the farmer is.
Now, assuming revenue, R, is distributed normally with mean,  and standard deviation

 then the density of R is represented by:
 ( R   )2

f ( R) 

e

2 2

.

 2

(3.4)

Hence, expected utility can also be represented by the expression:

1
EU ( R) 
 2

1

 2



 e

 R

 ( R   )2

e

2 2

dR





 e

(3.5)


( R   )2 
  R 

2 2 


dR.



(3.6)

Rearranging the exponent in (3.6) so as to group terms that depend on R and terms that
do not depend on R, we have:

R


( R   ) 2 ( R     2 ) 2
 2 







2 2
2 2
2 


(3.7)

Substituting (3.7) into (3.6) yields;

EU ( R)  

e

  2 
   


2  


 2

Now, for all  , ,
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e





( R    2 )2
2 2

dR.

(3.8)

1
 2



e

 ( R   / )2 


2
 2


dR  1,



(3.9)

because the left hand side of the equation is the area under the density function over the
entire support when the mean is  , , and with  as the standard deviation. Since this is so
for any  ', including  ,     2 , it follows that

EU ( R)  e


 2 
   


2 


.

(3.10)

To simplify the above expected utility function, we take log on both sides to linearize it.

 2 
ln EU ( R)     

2 


(3.11)

where  is the mean revenue and  2 is the variance associated with the revenue.
We assume that the effective objective function is given by the expression in brackets in
(3.11);



 2
2

(3.12)

Parameterizing (3.11), we may specify expected utility (EU) as:

EU currentcrop  1   2

2
2

(3.13)

(3.14)
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where EU currentcrop is the expected utility from the farmer’s current crop production,

EU

miscanthus

is the expected utility from Giant Miscanthus contract.  ,  2 are the

mean and variance of revenue associated with the farmer’s current crop production
respectively. DR , is the yield risk perception of the farmer’s current (existing) crop
production relative to Giant Miscanthus production. P , is the price associated with
Giant Miscanthus contract, Bh indicates whether harvesting would be done by the
biorefinery firm, In indicates the availability of insurance, Cl represents contract length,
and Cs represents cost-share. Finally, 1 to  8 are the coefficients to be estimated.

Random utility
In discrete choice analysis or in situations where we observe the choice an
individual makes given different alternatives available to the individual, the appropriate
framework which is usually used is the random utility. The framework had widely been
used in consumer settings, however, in this study it was applied to producers. This theory
which was formalized by McFadden (1974) and Hanemann (1984) forms the basis for
many preference elicitation procedures as well as non-experimental preference elicitation
procedures. In this study we assumed the producer’s expected utility is a function of
expected revenue and other factors known to the researcher as well as other factors which
provide the decision maker some utility but are unobservable to the researcher.
We assumed that a farmer makes his crop production choices to maximize
expected utility subject to technology and short-run fixed input constraints (such as land
availability). One crop production alternative could be a risky bioenergy crop such as
Giant Miscanthus. If we observe a farmer choosing to produce Giant Miscanthus under a
15

specified contract, then we assume that the expected utility from producing Giant
Miscanthus under such specified contract exceeds that of producing Giant Miscanthus
under an alternatively-specified contract as well as his next-best (existing crop)
alternative.
Due to the fact that there are some factors that are known to the individual or give
the decision maker utility but the researcher does not observe, we introduce the stochastic
or the random component, which will make probabilistic statements about the decision
maker’s utility. Given that

EU

miscanthus

 EU currentcrop 

j  k , all j  J where

J is the total number of alternatives, producer i chooses alternative j = 1, , J , which

maximizes expected utility. The probability that the ith individual chooses jth alternative
over another alternative say k is given by:

Pij  Pr( EUij   ij  EUik   ik )

, all j  J

Pij  Pr( ik   ij  EUij  EUik )

(3.15)
(3.16)

Although random utility theory usually does not take into account beliefs (risk
perceptions and risk preferences), in the random utility framework as presented in our
study, we incorporate some measures of farmers risk perceptions (yield risk perceptions)
as explanatory variables.
Since the study deals with farmers with different base crops (alternative crop) and
that the status-quo which is commonly assumed as zero may not necessary be so because
of the differences in farmers’ base crops and even their revenues, we strived to account
for heterogeneous status-quo by utilizing revenue and variance information. To capture
16

this information in the status-quo, using information on farmers’ price and yield
expectations of their current crop, we derived expected revenue per acre from producing
their alternative crops (which was scaled down by subtracting expected returns per acre
from Giant Miscanthus production). Using triangular distribution method we also
constructed mean,  and variance,  2 of revenue.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND DATA

This chapter provides a brief introduction to choice experiment. It provides
information on our proposed contract attributes and how the attributes were identified and
the levels specified for each attribute. Additionally, it provides information about the
design of the choice sets. The chapter as well explains how other individual - specific
characteristics such as risk preferences and risk perceptions were measured and included
in our econometric model(s). It finally ends with data collection method and summary
statistics of respondents’ demographic characteristics.
Choice experiment
Stated preference techniques are a series of methods or approaches to estimate the
value of goods and services not commonly bought and sold in existing markets (Mitchell
and Carson, 1989). These methods usually simulates market situations by creating
hypothetical scenarios in which respondents make decisions that mimic the reality of
markets. In choice experiments, attributes of interest are determined through an
extensive literature review, focus group discussions and often through discussions with
other experts in the field. Once the attributes of interest are chosen, the attribute levels
can be determined. The information obtained from choice experiments can be used in
designing policies and can also be used in cost benefit analysis (Hanley et al. 2001;
18

Mogas et al. 2006). The method has been employed in a series of studies. For instance,
Alfnes et al. (2006) employed the method to examine consumers’ willingness to pay for
salmon colour. Mercade et al. (2009) used stated choice experiment to examine
vegetable producers’ preferences for crop insurance. Roe, Sporleder, and Belleville
(2004) used the method to examine hog producers preferences for contracts.
Furthermore, Bergtold, Fewell, and Williams (2014) also used the method to identify
farmers’ willingness to produce bioenergy crops.
Attributes specification
Price
In searching for contract attributes, the first attribute which was considered was
price. It had the following levels: $50, $60, $70, $80, $90, and $100. Even though
currently there are no real markets for Giant Miscanthus or cellulosic feedstock in
general, the choice of these levels were guided by prices suggested by McLaughlin et al.
(2002) who proposed $44 /ton for U.S. biomass crops and Khanna et al. (2008) who
reported breakeven farm-gate price of Giant Miscanthus to be in the range of $41-$58.
Contract length
The second attribute of interest (contract length) which represents the number of
years the contract would last also had three levels, precisely 5, 9, and 13 years. Our
inclusion of this attribute was informed by Bergtold, Fewell, and William (2014). We
specified 5 years as the minimum contract length because Giant Miscanthus takes 2 to 3
years to reach first harvest so we believe this would allow the farmer to harvest for at
least the subsequent 2 years that follow after first harvest in order for the farmer to be
19

able to recover, at least partially, the initial establishment cost. In our econometric
model, contract length was modeled as a continuous variable.
Yield insurance availability
We specified an insurance attribute that indicated 65% coverage federal crop
insurance was available for farmers to purchase against crop failure. We chose 65%
because it is the average yield protection insurance coverage for most crops in the U.S.
This attribute was included to serve as a risk management tool for farmers to be able to
enter into production of Giant Miscanthus bearing in mind that there could be yield loss
as a result of unfavourable weather conditions and even pests and disease infestation,
even though there are no known pest of Giant Miscanthus and there have not been
biomass yield loss so far due to pests and diseases. The inclusion of yield insurance as an
attribute was also motivated by a study by Bergtold, Fewell, and Williams (2014).
Biorefinery harvest option
Harvesting of Giant Miscanthus is something that would be of major concern to
potential producers since producers may not have the right harvesting equipment. As a
result producers may want to consider a biorefinery harvest option. In view of this we
considered a forth binary attribute (dummy) to capture the effect of biorefinery harvest on
farmers’ willingness to accept a contract to produce Giant Miscanthus. This attribute has
previously been considered by Bergtold, Fewell, and William (2014).
Rhizome / establishment cost-share
Finally, as pointed out by Khanna et al. (2008) growing Giant Miscanthus
requires high initial cost. As a result we believe that potential producers may consider
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initial establishment cost-share. This form of support is captured in the government
program known as Biomass Crop Assistant Program (BCAP). In line with this, we
presented three levels for this attribute which were 0%, 25% and 50%. The 0% level
means that there is no government support for the farmer, which means that the farmer
shall bear all the initial establishment cost alone whereas 25% and 50% cost-share
reflects increasing BCAP cost-share. BCAP also has other form of providing support to
bioenergy crop producers, for example provision of matching payments. However for the
purpose of this study, we only considered establishment cost-share. This choice attribute
was modeled as a continuous variable.
Table 4.1 presents the summary of the attributes used in the choice set design.
Table 4.1

Contract Attributes and Levels

Attribute

Levels

Price offered per ton of the harvested grass

$50, $60, $70, $80, $90, $100

Contract length

5, 9, and 13 years

Rhizome / establishment cost-share

0%, 25% and 50%

Yield insurance availability

Yes / No

Biorefinery harvest

Yes / No

Risk preferences
From Spiegel’s derivation of mean-variance utility, it is clear that risk preference
plays a key role in an individual’s utility maximization. It has also been empirically
demonstrated as reported by for instance Petrolia et al. (2015), Petrolia, Landry, and
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Coble (2013), and Lusk and Coble (2005). As a result we incorporated these variables
into our analysis to identify how an individual’s risk preference influences the
individual’s acceptance of bioenergy crop production contract. In order to capture this
information, we developed three different question structures to elicit the same
information. The first question was a 5 point scale response question (  i 5 ) and the
second was a 3 point scale risk preference question (  i 3 ). Finally we collected certainty
equivalent information by asking the farmers to report the lowest price they would be
willing to forward a contract to produce their current crop (  iCE ). See Table. 4.2 below
for question formats.
Table 4.2

Risk preference questions

Relative to other farmers, how would you describe your willingness to accept risk in your
farm business?
Definitely will not accept risk Probably will not accept risk Indifferent to risk acceptance
Probably will accept risk

Definitely will accept risk

In general, do you consider yourself more or less a risk-taker than your family members,
friends and neighbor?
More

Less

About same

Assume you were offered the opportunity to lock in a certain price for your “current
crop” in the 2015 crop year. What is the lowest price for which you would forward
contract to eliminate all price risk for “current crop”. $……….

Risk perceptions
In order to gather information about how farmers perceive risk in their farming
operations, we presented respondents with questions which allowed them to report their
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price and yield expectations of their current crop. We as well allowed the farmers to
report to us how they perceive both yield risk of Giant Miscanthus relative to their
current crop mix which they were willing to substitute with Giant Miscanthus. Table 4.3
shows the various questions used in eliciting these information.
Table 4.3

Risk perception questions

What yield do you consider most likely for your current crop in 2015?
What do you expect will be your lowest yield in 10 years of growing “current crop?”
What do you expect will be your highest yield in 10 years of growing your “current
crop?”
What price do you consider to be the most likely harvest time price for your “current
crop” in 2015?
What price do you consider there to be only a 10% chance that the harvest time prices
will fall below?
What price do you consider there to be only a 10% chance that the harvest time prices
will rise above?
Research has shown that the average Miscanthus yield in Southeastern cropland is 12
tons/acre and ranges between 9-15 tons/acre. Would you consider that:
The yield risk of growing Miscanthus is ______________ the risk of growing your
alternative crop.
Less than

Equal to

Greater than

Efficient design of choice sets
Although orthogonal designs are more prevalent in the literature of Discrete
Choice Experiments (DCE), efficient designs have recently emerged as a new alternative
to facilitate choice experiment designs. As pointed out by Bliemer and Rose (2010,
2011) efficient designs lead to smaller standard errors in model estimation with small
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sample size. There are a variety of design efficiency measures such as A, B, D, and S.
For convenience D-error was used to determine the efficiency of our design since it is
fast and easily optimized (Kuhfeld, 2005). The D-error measures the inefficiency of the
design, hence the design with the lowest D- error is said to be D – optimal. The choice
sets were designed using NGENE software. In all, 12 choice sets (rows) were generated
which were put into 2 blocks, with 6 choice sets in each. Each respondent was randomly
assigned to a block and given 6 independent choice sets in which the respondent made
independent decisions in each choice scenario. Fig. 4.1 shows the choice sets design
generated by NGENE.
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MNL efficiency measures
D error
A error
B estimate
S estimate
Prior
Fixed
prior
value
Sp
estimate
s
Sp tratios

0.210175
0.62829
22.69945
59.629988
b2
0.025

b3(d0)
-0.45

b3(d1)
-0.225

b4(d0)
0.75

b4(d1)
0.375

b5(d0)
0.45

b6(d0)
0.375

3.84401
2

15.663
997

59.62998
8

6.9466
6

22.914
27

9.0786
93

12.331
371

0.99968
5

0.4952
28

0.253819

0.7436
49

0.4094
52

0.6504
96

0.5581
49

Design
Choice
situation

Optiona.
price
50
50
90
80
100
90
100
60
70
70
60
80

Optiona.
costshar
e
50
25
25
50
0
0
0
50
0
25
50
25

Option
a.insur
ance
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
0

Option
a.harv
est
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
0

Option
b.price

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Option
a.lengt
h
5
9
13
9
13
9
13
13
5
5
9
5

Option
b.lengt
h
9
5
5
13
5
13
9
9
13
13
5
9

Figure 4.1

100
90
60
70
50
60
50
90
70
80
100
80

Option
b.costs
hare
25
50
0
0
50
25
25
0
50
0
25
50

Option
b.insur
ance
1
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1

Optionb
.harvest

Block

0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1

1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2

Choice design output from NGENE software

Survey and data
Our survey instrument was partitioned into three main sections: The first section
contained set of general questions regarding farmers farming operations. The second part
presented a brief information about Giant Miscanthus followed by explanation of the
contract attributes and the choice sets. Fig.4.2 provides the information which was
provided to the respondent whereas Table 4.4 provides information about description of
the various contract attributes and Fig. 4.3 shows a typical choice set scenario as it was
presented to the respondent.
25

Below we present important facts about Giant Miscanthus, a crop with the potential for
production as a biofuel feedstock in the Southeastern U.S.
* Giant Miscanthus is a warm-season perennial (i.e. it comes back every year) grass which can
produce large amounts of biomass under our summer conditions. It is adapted to a wide range of
soils. However, best production is found on well - drained soils with medium to high fertility and
pH between 5.5 to 7.5.
* One of the varieties growing already in the Southeastern U.S. is FREEDOM which, on average,
can produce 12 tons or more of biomass per acre.
* Giant Miscanthus is a hybrid variety of Miscanthus. As a hybrid, Giant Miscanthus does not
produce viable seed and can only be propagated through rhizomes. Research made by USDA
NRCS sustain that Giant Miscanthus is a low risk to become invasive and with a fairly low rate of
spread that can easily be controlled through normal agricultural practices.
* As pictured below, plants can reach up to 12 feet in height and are established by planting
pieces of the root called rhizomes.
*It can be planted using existing agricultural equipment such as potato planters. It can be
harvested dry (<16% moisture), baled and stored under cover.
* Miscanthus has several uses including: a biomass crop for fuel, co-firing with coal, in coalburning power plants, or as bedding for livestock and poultry.
* Intensively managed Giant Miscanthus can produce low, but harvestable yields in the second
year. It generally takes 2-3 years for the grass to reach full harvest potential.
* Once established, a farmer does not have to incur any major costs, apart from the cost of
fertilizing to replace the lost nutrients each time the grass is harvested (average cost of $60-$70
/acre). Miscanthus also out-competes all weeds except climbing weeds (morning-glory and other
vines).
* The same stand of Miscanthus can typically be harvested on average for 15 years without
replanting. However, to get rid of it, a late summer / fall application of glyphosphate and / or
graminicide at the biomass appropriate rate will kill 99% of the material.
*As a part of the Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP), USDA has funded the
establishment and production of Giant Miscanthus in states like Missouri, Arkansas, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania. USDA requires that farmers must only use a sterile variety of Giant Miscanthus.
Additionally, the farmers must agree to practices that reduce any possible spread for Giant
Miscanthus beyond the perimeters of the field.
* In this research we propose the only use of sterile Miscanthus varieties approved by the USDA.

Figure 4.2

Information about Giant Miscanthus
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Table 4.4

Description of contract attributes

Contract Attribute

Price paid

Contract Length

Biorefinery Harvest

Description
Represents the price biorefinery would offer for every ton of
Giant Miscanthus harvested at farm gate. Price per acre is
reported in parentheses, assuming that the yield of Giant
Miscanthus is on average 12 tons per acre.
Represents the time commitment in consecutive years of the
contractual agreement.
Option “Yes” indicates that the bio-refinery will harvest and
transport the biomass at their expense.
Option “No” means that under the contractual agreement,
the farmer is responsible for harvest at his own cost, but the
biorefinery is responsible for transporting to plant.
At the present time there is no insurance policies for biofuel
production. However, as part of this research we want to
study how important this option will be for future policy.
Assuming that Miscanthus insurance is put in place similar
to other major crops.

Yield Insurance

“Yes” indicates 65% Coverage Federal Crop Insurance is
available against crop failure.
“No” indicates 65% Coverage Federal Crop
Insurance is not available to the farmer to purchase.

Biomass Crop Assistance Program (BCAP) provides
financial assistance with establishment, including a one-time
payment of up to 50% of the cost of establishment and annual
Rhizome/Establishment payments of up to 5 years for Giant Miscanthus. It is
administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's
Cost-Share
(USDA's) Farm Service Agency (FSA) and extended by the
Farm Bill 2014.
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Suppose a biorefinery is offering you the contracts below to produce Giant Miscanthus as
against producing your current crop, which option would you prefer?
Contract
A
$100/ton
($1200/acre)

Contract
B
$90/ton
($1080/acre)

No
Contract

Contract Length

9 years

9 years

Biorefinery Harvest

No

Yes

Yes

No

25%

0%

I would not
grow
Miscanthus
under the
offered
contracts
and would
maintain
my current
crop mix

Attribute
Price Paid

Yield Insurance Available
Rhizome/Establishment CostShare
I would choose...
[Check only one]
Contract A

Figure 4.3

Contract B

No Contract

Sample choice set scenario

Lastly, the third part of the survey contained risk assessment questions (for
instance questions eliciting risk preferences and risk perceptions) and demographic
characteristics of the respondents’. See Appendix A for details.
We programed our survey using Qualtrics survey software (Qualtrics Labs, Inc.
2014). Links to the survey were initially sent by a third party to 12 farmers from
Mississippi in August 2014 to pretest the instrument. Once the necessary modifications
were made after pretesting, the surveys were sent to our target population. To ensure we
reached out to farmers at a time when they were not very busy so we could get them to
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answer our survey, we waited until mid-December of 2014, when most farmers were
through with their harvesting before e-mailing respondents with the link to the survey.
The target population were crop and /or pasture farmers in Mississippi and North
Carolina. We also sampled from a group known as “25 x' 25 Alliance”. Farmers from
North Carolina were reached through a professor from North Carolina State University
who had contacts of the farmers. After informing the farmers, he e-mailed each farmer
with the link to the survey. The same approach was followed in getting respondents from
Mississippi as well as respondents from “25 x' 25 Alliance”.
A week after sending out the first e-mail, we sent out e-mail reminders to the
respondents. After these reminders we saw that the responses to the survey were not
encouraging, so we offered each respondent a $25 Walmart electronic gift certificate
upon completion of the survey. Respondents provided us with their names and e-mail
addresses which were eventually used to send the Walmart electronic gift certificate.
In all we contacted a total of about 565 farmers. After following all these
procedures and sending multiple e-mail reminders, we had 56 farmers who completed the
survey which yielded 336 (6 x 56) observations, which was about 10% response rate. It
should be emphasized that each respondent answered 6 independent choice set scenarios.
We also had 96 incomplete (people who started filling the survey but stopped at some
point and never came back to it). However, these responses were not included in our
analysis. Breakdown of the number of people who completed the survey are presented in
Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5

Breakdown of respondents

Location

No. of farmers
contacted

No. of farmers No. of farmers Completion
who did not
who
rate (%)
complete
completed
16
28
12%

Mississippi

240

North Carolina

300

75

19

6%

25 x' 25 Alliance

25

5

9

36%

Total

565

96

56

10%

Table 4.6, reports the crops respondents were producing. The results suggest that
most of the farmers produce corn, soybean, and pasture. Although as presented, a single
farmer could be engaged in multiple crop productions. Presented in Table 4.7 is a
summary of crops respondents were willing to substitute with Giant Miscanthus. The
results suggest that most of the farmers sampled were willing to substitute soybean and
pasture production with Giant Miscanthus production under contracts.
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Respondents’ current crop production

Table 4.6

Frequency1

Crop
Soybean

33

Corn

30

Pasture

27

Wheat

16

Rice

10

Cotton

7

Grain Sorghum (Milo)

7

Other crops
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Table 4.7

Crops chosen to substitute with Giant Miscanthus

Type of crop

Frequency

Percentage

Soybean

17

30%

Pasture

12

21%

Corn

9

16%

Wheat

4

7%

Grain Sorghum (Milo)

3

5%

Cotton

1

2%

Rice

1

2%

Other crops

9

16%

Total

56

100%

1

Out of a total of 56 producers
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Reported in Table 4.8 are the frequencies at which farmers chose their current
crop production or Giant Miscanthus production contracts (Contracts A and B). The
results suggest if Giant Miscanthus contracts are available some farmers would most
likely be willingness to produce the grass.
Table 4.8

Respondents’ choice of Giant Miscanthus contract vs. current crop

Alternative

Frequency

Percentage

Giant Miscanthus contract

218

64.9%

Status-quo (option C)

118

35.1%

Total

336

100.0%

Demographic characteristics of respondents
To have a fair idea of respondents’ background, we collected some demographic
information of respondents. Of the 56 participants who completed the survey, 50
representing about 89% of the respondents were males. Only 6 of the respondents were
females. This suggests that farming in the study area is dominated by males. The
average age of the farmers sampled was approximately 47 years. This suggests most of
the farmers are in their productive age. Respondents’ household size ranged from 1 to 6
members with average household size of about 3 members. Furthermore we also elicited
information about farm sizes of the farmers. The average farm size of our survey
respondents was found to be around 1755 acres, which is high compared to the average
farm size for the two states we sampled from (NC =168 acres, MS = 287 acres) (2012
Census of Agriculture, USDA-NASS). However, the high average farm size for our
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sample could be attributed to our target population who were mostly commercial farmers
who operate on large scales. The Census of Agriculture captures every farmer in the state
including farmers who operate on even an acre of land. This could be the reason why the
average farm size for the two states are very small compared to our sample statistics.
Majority of the farmers sampled had been in the farming business for more than 10 years.
This indicates that respondents were able to forecast expected yields and prices of their
current crop. Also the survey respondents were asked to indicate the percentage of their
income that comes from farming. Results indicated that on average about 61% of the
farmers’ income come from farming, which suggests their dependence on farming. We
as well elicited information about farmers’ level of educational attainment. Interestingly
none of the farmers surveyed had less than high school education or in other words spent
less than 12 years for formal education. Majority of the farmers completed a 4 – year
degree (B.S or B.A) or spent on average about 16 years or more in formal education.
This shows that farmers were able to read and understand our survey questions. The
summary statistics of demographic variables of the survey respondents are reported in
Table 4.9 below.
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Table 4.9

Summary statistics of demographic variables

Variable

Mean

Std. Dev.

Age (years)

47.29

10.05

55

Household size

3.39

1.39

56

Farm size (acres)

1755

2326

56

Farming experience (years)

12.88

4.21

56

Years of formal education

15.93

1.82

56

40.78

55

Percent of income from farm (%) 61.16

No. of
individuals

Deriving a common status-quo for respondents
The study involved farmers who were engaged in different crop production and as
a result were willing to substitute different crop with production of Giant Miscanthus
under contracts. Since these crops are measured in different yield units with different
prices per units, it suggests we have status-quo which was different for these survey
respondents. Therefore we accounted for this heterogeneous status-quo. For instance we
had farmers who were willing to substitute soybean, corn, sweet sorghum, pasture with
Giant Miscanthus production. In order to get a common measure as status-quo other than
assuming the usual zero which is always assumed in most cases, we resorted to using
farmers expected total revenue per acre from the production of their respective alternative
crops. To achieve this we utilized information on farmers’ expectations of yield and
prices of their current crop we elicited from our survey. Based on this information, we
were able to calculate expected revenue per acre by multiplying expected yield per acre
by expected price per unit. We then scaled revenue by subtracting expected returns per
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acre for growing Giant Miscanthus assuming a 10 year contract (69 x 12 x 8 /10) to
obtain our net revenue. We assumed $69 is the expected price per ton of harvested
Miscanthus and 12 tons per acre is the expected yield of Miscanthus (these information
were made known to the respondents). Since Giant Miscanthus takes about 2 to 3 years
to reach full harvest potential it suggests that farmers who agree to produce Giant
Miscanthus would have to wait till the end of the third year when there is actual harvest
before they could get proceeds. In effect for a contract which would last for 10 years,
farmers would actually receive payment for 8 years since they would have to wait until
the end of year three when they would actually harvest and sell to the firm. Considering
the 10 year period, revenue per acre would be given by (69 x 12 x 8) / 10. We divided by
10 to account for the 3 year waiting period.
However, there were some challenges in getting the total revenue per acre for
some pasture farmers. To be able to derive total revenue per acre for these farmers, we
visited with an Extension Economist at the Department of Agricultural Economics at
Mississippi State University who guided us to convert the units provided by these farmers
to a more workable unit based on the extra information the farmers provided. For
example, some farmers reported their yield units in number of heads per acre per year,
and reported price units in dollars per pound. Given the units and other extra information
they provided, for a pasture grazed by cattle we multiplied the number of heads of cattle
per year by 550 pounds (average weight) before multiplying it by the price per pound in
order to obtain revenue per acre. However, there were some units which we could not
convert and so we excluded these responses from our analysis. We also tried to
incorporate certainty equivalent as a measure of risk aversion in our framework. As a
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result we constructed a variable by dividing the lowest price respondents were willing to
lock in a contract to produce their current crop by their expected price. This was derived
by the expression:

 iCE 

lowest price to lock in contract
expected price

(4.1)

Farmers with  iCE  1 were considered as risk averse,  iCE  1 were considered as risk
neutral, and finally, farmers with  iCE  1 were considered as risk seekers.
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CHAPTER V
ECONOMETRIC MODEL

The basic conditional logit model has widely been used to examine peoples’
preferences. This framework however, assigns a single preference coefficient for all
individuals and does not allow for taste / preference variation (Cushing and Cushing
2007). This model implies individuals put the same weight or preference parameter on an
attribute. However, this may not be the case in every situation and that individuals may
have different preference parameters. The conditional logit model does not account for
scale difference (IIA assumption) which could be too restrictive. To be able to test for
the existence of preference heterogeneity in producers’ preferences for contract attributes,
as well as account for scale difference (i.e. relaxing IIA assumption) we adopted a model
that allowed us to test for preference heterogeneity and also relaxes the IIA assumption.
As a result the choice probability as discussed in this work was estimated by specifying a
Random Parameter Logit (RPL) model. According to (Cushing and Cushing 2007), the
mixed logit model (RPL) is similar to the conditional logit model except that it relaxes
the assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternative (IIA) and also allows
preference parameter estimates to vary across individuals.
Random Parameter Logit (RPL) assumes that each individual have unique set of
preference parameters and so it tries to introduce heterogeneity in preference by ‘singling
out’ preferences. Although the researcher is not able to observe individual preferences,
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some distribution of preferences is assumed by the analyst across the population and by
so doing treating each individual’s preference as some random draw from the distribution
(Moore 2008). Examples of distributions which the analyst can assume include: normal,
uniform, lognormal, and triangular distributions. Mathematically, according to Train
(2009) the individual’s choice probability in RPL’s framework could be given by:
Pij   Lij (  ) f (  )d 

(5.1)

where; Pij is the probability that the individual i , chooses alternative j,

Lij ( ) is the logit probability evaluated at parameters  :

Lij (  ) 

exp  ' X ij
J

 exp  ' X
j 1

ik

(5.2)

f (  ) , is the density function, X is a vector of measured attributes.

Substituting Lij ( ) , into (5.1), the probability could be given by:


 exp  ' X
ij
Pij    J

  exp  ' X ik
 j 1



 f (  )d 




(5.3)

The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood.
According to Train (2009), the log-likelihood function is given by:
N

LL(  )   ln Pi (  )
n 1
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(5.4)

where  , is a vector of parameters, Pi (  ) is the probability of the choice made by
individual i, and N indicates the total number of farmers who made independent choices.
The maximum likelihood estimator is the value of  which maximizes LL(  ) . The
simulated maximum likelihood estimator is the value of simulated approximation of 
which maximizes SLL(  ) (simulated log-likelihood). Our models were estimated using
200 to 600 Halton draws in increments of 50 and we finally reported the results from 600
draws.
In modeling our choice probabilities, alternative econometric specifications were
specified. However, it should be emphasized that in all the econometric models
specified, we accounted for Carson and Czajkowski’s correction. Carson and
Czajkowski (2013) argue that to derive welfare estimates such as willingness-to- pay,
from discrete choice models, the price or cost parameter should be allowed to be random
with the standard deviation constrained to zero. Since the price coefficient is known to
have the same sign for every individual, according to (Train 2009) a lognormal
distribution is imposed on the price coefficient. We also imposed a normal distribution
on the constant coefficient to account for utility difference among individuals which the
basic conditional logit model is not able to account for.
Our empirical RPL model was specified as shown below:

Pij



 




exp(  0  1   2



2



 f (  )d 
2

 3 ( * DR )  [  4 P  5 Bh   6 In   7 Cl  8Cs ]) 


2
 3 ( * DR )  [  4 P  5 Bh   6 In   7 Cl  8Cs ])

2
2
J

 exp(  0  1   2
j 1
2
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(5.5)

The simple RPL model had only parameter 0 specified as random whereas the other
RPL model had all the parameters for contract attributes, i.e.  5 to  8 specified as
random in addition to 0 . Reported in Table 5.1 is a summary and description of all the
variables that entered our econometric models.
Table 5.1

Summary and description of variables

Variables
Dependent variable: Choice = 1 if an alternative was
chosen , 0 otherwise
Contract Attributes
Price ($)
Biorefinery harvest = 1, 0 otherwise
Insurance = 1, 0 otherwise
Contract length (years)
Cost share (%)
Risk Perception
Net revenue (scaled by /100) ($)
Variance (  2 ) (scaled by /1000)
DR1 = 1 if a farmer perceives yield risk of
Miscanthus < his current crop, 0 otherwise
DR2 = 1, if a farmer perceives yield risk of
Miscanthus > his current crop, 0 otherwise
Risk Preference
Risk averse
 i5

i3

Mean

Std. Dev.

75.00
0.50
0.50
9 .00
25.22

17.52
0.50
0.50
3.27
20.29

3.75
102.93
0.33

19.95
389.3
0.47

0.26

0.44

0.25

0.43

Risk seeker
Risk averse

0.57
0.13

0.50
0.50

Risk seeker

0.45
1.09

0.50
0.18

 iCE
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Estimated models
In the existing literature, studies similar to this study have assumed a status-quo
utility as zero for example, Bergtold, Fewell, and Williams (2014). However this may
not be the case in every situation, especially when you are dealing with farmers
producing different crops and perhaps with different net returns. Due to this short fall we
tried to improve the existing framework by specifying utility to account for
heterogeneous status-quo alternatives by capturing net revenue and variance as well as
risk preference and perception information. We then tested these models with the base
model (i.e. model with status-quo assumed as zero) to determine whether there is
significant model improvement.
Depending on the variables chosen to capture status-quo heterogeneity, we
estimated 5 general categories of models (i.e. Categories A, B, C, D, and E). Each
category had 2 different model specifications. In the first model in every category, we
randomized only the constant (models A1, B1, C1, D1, and E1). In the second model we
randomized the constant as well as all the contract attribute parameters i.e. harvest,
insurance, contract length, and cost-share parameters (models A2, B2, C2, D2, and E2).
Both models in Category A (models A1, A2) had status-quo utility of zero.
Models in Category B (models B1, B2) were models with utility of the status-quo set
equal net revenue, variance (  2 ) of net revenue, and interaction of variance and farmers
relative yield risk perception (DR) of Giant Miscanthus to that of their current crop
production (  2 *DR). Category C (models C1, C2) had utility of the status-quo as net
revenue and variables derived by interacting our 5 point scale risk preference responses
(  i 5 ) and  2 as well as relative yield risk perception (DR). It must be emphasized that
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we collapsed the responses into three categories (i.e. the first two responses as one group
(risk-averse), the middle response as one group (risk-neutral), and the last two responses
as another group (risk-seeker)) and dummy variables were defined for the respective
groups.
For models in Category D (models D1 and D2), the utility of the status-quo were
specified as the net revenue and variables derived by interacting our 3 point scale risk
preference responses (  i 3 ) and  2 of the net revenue as well as relative yield risk
perception (DR). Finally Category E models (i.e. E1 and E2) used net revenue and
variables derived interacting our certainty equivalent risk preference measure (  iCE ) and

 2 as well as relative yield risk perception variable (DR) as the utility of the status-quo.
Table 5.2 presents a summary of all the models with their respective random
coefficients and status-quo.
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Table 5.2

Summary of models estimated

Category

Model

Random coefficient(s)

A1

Constant

A2

Constant, Harvest,
Insurance, Contract length,
and Cost-share

B1

Constant

Variables
introduced to
capture status-quo
heterogeneity

A

B
B2

C1
C
C2

D1
D

D2

E1
E
E2

None (0)

Net revenue,  2 , 
Constant, Harvest,
, and relative yield
Insurance, Contract length, risk perception (DR)
and Cost-share
Constant
Net revenue,  2 ,
Constant, Harvest,
Insurance, Contract length,  i 5 , and relative
and Cost-share
yield risk perception
(DR)
Constant

Net revenue,  2 ,  i 3
Constant, Harvest,
Insurance, Contract length, ,and relative yield
risk perception (DR)
and Cost-share

Constant
Net revenue,  2 ,
Constant, Harvest,
Insurance, Contract length,  iCE , and relative
and Cost-share
yield risk perception
(DR)
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In all the models estimated, we also controlled for choice set question order. This
was necessary because it has been argued that when a single individual is allowed to
answer multiple choice set scenarios, at the later stages the respondent tends to select the
status-quo option which could bias the results. As a result we created dummies for the
order in which respondents saw each choice set scenario and we set the first choice
scenario as the base.
After estimating all the models explained above, we carried out log-likelihood
ratio tests to identify which model(s) best fit our data. The likelihood ratio test according
to Greene (2012) is given by the formula;
^

^

LR  2(ln L RE  ln LUN )
^

(5.6)

^

where LR is the likelihood ratio, L RE and LUN are the log-likelihood functions of the
restricted and unrestricted models respectively. Usually the simpler model (restricted
model) has fewer parameters than the unrestricted model. The LR test statistic is usually
distributed as a chi-squared random variable, with degrees of freedom which is equal to
the difference in the total number of coefficients in the two models.
We performed our likelihood ratio test by testing all the other categories of model
with the base category A (i.e. the category with utility of status-quo of zero). It must be
re-emphasized that each model from a category was tested against its corresponding
model in the base category. For instance a model with all coefficients of contract
attributes set as random in Category B was tested against the model in the base Category
A with the same random coefficients. The only difference had to do with the differences

44

in the status-quo. In all, we compared categories i.e. B, C, D, and E to the base models
(Category A models).
Expectations
We sought to estimate these econometric models to be able to calculate marginal
contributions (dollar value) of each contract attribute to the overall contract value. Even
though we cannot say much about the magnitude of the parameter estimates themselves,
based on literature and theory, we anticipated how the signs on the coefficients would be.
We expected that price, cost – share, biorefinery harvest, and yield insurance would all
have positively signed parameter estimates. However, for contract length, based on
Bergtold et al.’s study in 2014, we expected its sign to be negative. We also expected
some preference heterogeneity in producers’ preferences for contract attributes.
In terms of model improvement, we expected that incorporating risk preference
and risk perception information as well as accounting for heterogeneous status-quo
alternatives in the utility framework should result in significant model improvement.
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents empirical results and discusses findings of the study. The
chapter begins by reporting results from the various RPL models. It then discusses
producers’ preferences for contract attributes, preference heterogeneity in their
preferences for contract attributes, and how risk preferences and risk perceptions affect
producers’ decisions to accept contracts. It finally reports likelihood ratio test results
and also provides WTA estimates.
Results from the random parameter logit models
Results under this section are reported in groups. They are reported in the order
in which the models were categorized (Categories A, B, C, D, and E) based on how the
utility of the status-quo was specified as explained in the preceding chapter. Table 6.1
reported results of Category A models (A1 and A2), presented in Table 6.2 are the results
of Category B models (B1 and B2). Furthermore we also reported Category C models
(C1 and C2) in Table 6.3 whereas Category D models (D1 and D2) are reported in Table
6.4. Finally we presented Category E models (E1 ad E2) in Table 6.5. In addition to the
parameter estimates in each table, we also reported the associated log - likelihood
function, McFadden Pseudo R-square, and AIC.
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Table 6.1

Results of Category A models (Models A1 and A2)
A1

A2

Variable

Coefficient
(Std. error)

Std. Dev.
(Std. error)

Coefficient
(Std. error)

Std. Dev.
(Std. error)

Constant

-2.239**
(0.940)

2.696***
(0.492)

-3.746***
(1.214)

2.657***
(0.725)

Price (lnβ)

0.036***
(0.174)
1.102***
(0.173)

0.054***
(0.171)
1.555***
(0.458)

1.248***
(0.426)

Insurance

0.296*
(0.171)

0.334
(0.328)

1.042***
(0.422)

C. Length

-0.090***
(0.031)

-0.155**
(0.064)

0.180**
(0.072)

Cost - Share

0.013**
(0.005)

0.018**
(0.008)

0.018
(0.011)

Order2

0.318
(0.656)
-0.457
(0.676)
-1.182
(0.728)
-0.482
(0.556)
-1.391*
(0.721)
-268.315

0.638
(0.721)
-0.300
(0.683)
-0.825
(0.868)
-0.328
(0.644)
-1.427*
(0.862)
-258.707

Harvest

Order3
Order4
Order5
Order6
Log likelihood

Sig. level :
0.000

AIC

560.6

549.4

McFadden
Pseudo R-sq.
No. Obs.

0.232

0.260

318

Panel = 53

318

Sig. level :
0.000

Panel = 53

NOTE: Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **,* represents significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% statistical levels of significance respectively.
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Results as reported in Table 6.1 above indicated that price and biorefinery harvest
were both significant at 1% level of statistical significance in both models. We also
found that contract length, and cost- share were both significant at 5% level of statistical
significance in both results. Insurance was however not statistically significant at the 5%
level. All the contract attributes had the signs we were expecting. Results also showed
that none of the dummies which controlled for the choice set question order was
significant at 5% level of statistical significance. This suggests that there was no
evidence that respondents tend to select the status-quo at the later stages of answering the
choice set question. This implies that there was no bias in our estimates as a result of
how respondents answered the choice set questions.
In terms of testing for producers’ preference heterogeneity for contract attributes,
we found that the standard deviations for harvest, insurance, contract length were all
statistically significant at the 5% percent level of significance. This provides evidence of
heterogeneity in producers’ preferences for biorefinery harvest, contract length, and
insurance. Furthermore the significance of the standard deviation for the constant
indicated there was scale difference. This supports our use of a random parameter logit
model rather than using conditional logit which fails to account for scale difference.
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Table 6.2

Results of Category B models (Model B1 and B2)
B1

B2

Variable

Coefficient
(Std. error)

Std. Dev.
(Std. error)

Coefficient
(Std. error)

Std. Dev.
(Std. error)

Constant

-2.308***
(0.359)

2.308***
(0.360)

-3.060***
(1.368)

2.205***
(0.691)

Price (lnβ)

0.039***
(0.152)
1.154***
(0.172)

0.053***
(0.170)
1.535***
(0.440)

1.203***
(0.410)

Insurance

0.331*
(0.179)

0.336
(0.355)

1.104**
(0.480)

C. Length

-0.091***
(0.033)

-0.160***
(0.069)

0.191***
(0.076)

Cost - Share

0.014***
(0.005)

0.018**
(0.008)

0.018
(0.011)

0.464
(0.617)
-0.322
(0.655)
-0.974
(0.672)

0.648
(0.721)
-0.254
(0.713)
-0.789
(0.926)

Log likelihood

-0.336
(0.565)
-1.198**
(0.643)
-0.087
(0.158)
0.008
(0.028)
-0.001
(0.028
0.008
(0.029)
-265.169

-0.272
(0.690)
-1.436
(0.885)
-0.100
( 0.219)
0.009
( 0.053)
0.001
(0.461)
0.009
(0.044)
-255.635

AIC

560.300

551.300

0.241

0.268

Harvest

Order2
Order3
Order4
Order5
Order6
Net revenue

2
 2 *DR1
 2 *DR2

McFadden Pseudo Rsq.
No. Obs.

318

Sig. level :
0.000

Panel = 53

318

Sig. level :
0.000

Panel = 53

NOTE: Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **,* represents significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% statistical levels of significance respectively.
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Reported in Table 6.2 are results for Category B models. Results from both
models indicated that all contract attributes were significant at the 5% level of
significance with the exception of yield insurance. The results also indicated that all the
contract attributes had the right signs as expected. Price, biorefinery harvest, insurance,
and cost-share all had positive signs. Contract length was negatively related with
producers’ willingness to accept contracts. This suggests that the longer the contract the
less willing are producers in accepting contracts to produce Giant Miscanthus. This
finding is consistent with the findings by Bergtold, Fewell, and Williams (2014). To our
surprise none of the estimates for the variables in the status-quo was significant.
However, this result could be attributed to the small sample size.
With regards to identifying whether there exists preference heterogeneity in
producers’ preferences for contract attributes, we found that the standard deviations for
biorefinery harvest, insurance, and contract length were all statistically significant at 5%.
This suggests there is a significant difference in the weights producers’ associates with
each of the contract attributes.
The researcher’s argument was that the utility of the status-quo should not be
assumed as zero in stated choice experiments which sort to identify producers’
preferences for contracts to produce risky bioenergy crops. As a result we specified 2
models which used net revenue and the interaction of variance and our 5 point scale risk
preference responses (  i 5 ) as well as farmers perception of yield risk of Giant
Miscanthus relative to their current crop as the status-quo utility. Table 6.3 reported the
results for these 2 models.
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Table 6.3

Results of Category C models (Model C1 and C2)
C1

C2

Variable

Coefficient
(Std. error)

Std. Dev.
(Std. error)

Constant

-1.605
(1.031)

2.212***
(0.466)

Coefficient Std. Dev.
(Std. error) (Std. error)
-2.673**
(1.352)

2.030***
(0.664)

0.036***
(0.180)
1.100***
(0.189)

0.049***
(0.188)
1.435***
0.421)

1.181***
(0.391)

Insurance

0.293*
(0.178)

0.327
(0.314)

0.880**
(0.522)

C. Length

-0.090***
(0.032)

-0.143**
(0.063)

0.164**
(0.072)

Cost - Share

0.013**
(0.005)

0.017**
(0.007)

0.008
(0.016)

Order2

0.315
(0.796)
-0.463
(0.751)
-1.183
(0.819)
-0.490
(0.607)
-1.387*
(0.764)
-0.082
(0.154)
0.005
(0.300)
0.068
(0.085)
0.066
(0.322)
-0.269
(0.422)
-0.054
(0.090)

0.569
(0.781)
-0.319
(0.750)
-0.882
(0.929)
-0.329
(0.664)
-1.430
(0.907)
-0.090
(0.245)
-0.057
(0.320)
0.055
(0.115)
0.102
(0.337)
-0.235
(0.389)
-0.037
(0.115)

Price (lnβ)
Harvest

Order3
Order4
Order5
Order6
Net revenue

 2 *risk averse

 2 *risk seeker
 2 *risk averse*DR1
 2 *risk averse*DR2
 2 *risk seeker*DR1
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Table 6.3 (continued)

 2 * risk seeker*DR2

-0.001
(0.087)

0.019
(0.104)

Log likelihood

-260.242

AIC

558.500

550.500

0.255

0.278

McFadden Pseudo R-sq.
No. of observations

318

Sig. level 0.000

Panel = 53

-252.236

318

Sig. level : 0.000

Panel = 53

NOTE: Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * represents significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% statistical levels of significance respectively.
The results found price and biorefinery harvest as significant and positively
related to producers’ willingness to accept contract to produce bioenergy feedstock at the
1% level of statistical significance in both models. The results showed that respondents
put a higher weight on the binary attribute which captured the effect of harvesting by the
biorefinery firm. Although insurance and cost-share both had positive signs as expected,
insurance for instance was only significant in model C1 and it was significant at the 10%
level of statistical significance. This suggests that potential producers of Giant
Miscanthus are not concerned much about the availability of yield insurance in their
decisions to producing Giant Miscanthus under established contracts. However, cost share was significant at 5% in both models. Surprisingly none of the variables in the
status-quo was significant.
Eliciting risk preferences utilizing survey method can be challenging hence we
used different wordings and question formats in order to elicit producers risk preferences.
Apart from using a 5 point scale, we as well used a 3 point scale risk preference measure
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to elicit risk preference information from the respondents (  i 3 ). Dummy variables were
created for each response category and were finally interacted with the variance and yield
risk variables and together with net revenue we specified these variables as the utility of
the status-quo. Results for this category of models (Category D) are presented in Tables
6.4 below.

Table 6.4

Results of Category D models (Model D1 and D2)
D1

D2

Variable

Coefficient
(Std. error)

Std. Dev.
(Std. error)

Constant

-2.102**
(1.015)

2.217***
(0.484)

Price (lnβ)

0.036***
(0.205)

0.051***
(0.194)

Harvest

1.101***
(0.205)

1.488***
(0.444)

1.120***
(0.416)

Insurance

0.298
(0.193)

0.335
(0.341)

0.962**
(0.470)

C. Length

-0.090***
(0.039)

-0.140**
(0.068)

0.161**
(0.075)

Cost - Share

0.013**
(0.005)

0.017*
(0.009)

0.014
(0.012)

Order2

0.319
(0.675)
-0.462
(0.769)
-1.168
(0.799)
-0.487
(0.645)
-1.378*
(0.811)

0.587
(0.736)
-0.322
(0.799)
-0.890
(1.010)
-0.338
(0.074)
-1.418*
(0.986)

Order3
Order4
Order5
Order6

53

Coefficient Std. Dev.
(Std. error) (Std. error)
-3.193***
(1.320)

2.191***
(0.732)

Table 6.4 (continued)
Net revenue
(/1000)
 2 *risk averse

 2 *risk seeker

 2 *risk
averse*DR1
 2 *risk
averse*DR2
 2 *risk
seeker*DR1
 2 *Risk
seeker*DR2
Log likelihood
AIC

-0.016
(0.064)
-0.029
(63*10^5)
0.010
(0.082)
0.103
(13*10^7)
-0.070
(63*10^5)
-0. 206
(0.610)
0.147
(0.144)
260.473

-0.0004
(0.071)
-0.030
(32*10^5)
0.023
(0.150)
0.032
(41*10^5)
-0.034
(33*10^5)
-0.196
(0.621)
0.143
(0.200)
Sig. level : 0.000 -252.045

558.900

Sig. level :
0.000

550.100

McFadden Pseudo
0.254
0.279
R-sq.
No. of
318
Panel = 53
318
Panel = 53
observations
NOTE: Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **,* represents significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% statistical levels of significance respectively.
Results as reported in the Table 6.4 showed that price, harvest, cost-share and
insurance as expected, all had positive signs. However, whiles price and harvest
coefficients were both statistically significant at 1% in both models; cost-share was
significant at the 5% only in model D1. The results showed that insurance was not
significant in any of the models. Contract length was negative and statistically significant
at 5% in both models. The results then suggest that price, biorefinery harvest, cost share,
and contract length were significant predictors of the probability of a farmer accepting
contract to produce Giant Miscanthus.
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Although when compared with the base models (i.e. Category A models), we
observed significant model improvement as reported by the likelihood ratio tests,
however none of the variables in the status-quo which we believe brought about the
model improvement was individually significant.
Another measure which was used in eliciting risk preference was the certainty
equivalent information. This was derived by asking respondents to report the lowest
price they would be willing to lock up in a contract to continue producing their current
crop(s). We divided these prices by farmers’ expected prices. This variable together
with net revenue, variance, and yield risk perception variables were specified as the
utility of status-quo for a fifth category of model called Category E (models E1 and E2).
Results from the estimations of these models are presented in Table 6.5
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Table 6.5

Results of Category E models (Model E1 and E2)
E1

E2

Variable

Coefficient
(Std. error)

Std. Dev.
(Std. error)

Coefficient
(Std. error)

Std. Dev.
(Std. error)

Constant

-1.538
(1.140)

2.466***
(0.473)

-2.903 **
(1.350)

2.323***
(0.697)

0.036***
(0.190)
1.101***
(0.200)

0.052***
(0.170)
1.478***
(0.418)

1.187***
(0.416)

Insurance

0.295
(0.193)

0.323
(0.328)

1.000**
(0.487)

C. Length

-0.090***
(0.035)

-0.154**
(0.067)

0.187***
(0.070)

Cost - Share

0.013**
(0.005)

0.017**
(0.008)

0.016
(0.012)

Order2

Log likelihood

0.317
(0.658)
-0.460
(0.700)
-1.182
(0.804)
-0.445
(0.585)
-1.392*
(0.746)
0.145
(0.174)
-0.011
(0.035)
0.001
(0.032)
-0.012
(0.033)
-264.541

AIC

561.100

551.500

0.243

0.268

Price (lnβ)
Harvest

Order3
Order4
Order5
Order6
Net revenue

 iCE *  2
 iCE *  2 *DR1

 iCE *  2 *DR2

McFadden Pseudo
R-sq.
No. of observations

318

Sig. level :
0.000

Panel = 53

0.624
(0.740)
-0.305
(0.725)
-0.823
(0.968)
-0.306
(0.696)
-1.428
(0.852)
0.133
(0.222)
-0.013
(0.050)
0.003
(0.042)
-0.010
(0.041)
-255.727

318

Sig. level :
0.000

Panel = 53

NOTE: Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **,* represents significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% statistical levels of significance respectively.
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Reported in Table 6.5 are the results for Category E models. We found that price,
cost- share, harvest, and contract length coefficients were all significant at 5% level of
statistical significance. However, parameter estimate for insurance was not statistically
significant. This was not surprising as it had been observed to be following the same
trend in the previous results. Even though the coefficient for insurance was not
significant, it however, had the right sign. The coefficient for contract length was
negative and significant at the 5% level of statistical significance. This suggests farmers
preferred shorter contracts to produce Giant Miscanthus. Again although there was
significant model improvement as a result of the inclusion of the variables in the statusquo, none of these variables was significant.
Results as reported in Table 6.5 above revealed that standard deviations for yield
insurance, contract length, and biorefinery harvest were all significant at 5% level of
statistical significance. This was interesting since it suggests that there exists preference
heterogeneity in producers’ preferences for all these contract attributes. However we
found that there was no preference heterogeneity in producers’ preferences for cost share. Thus it suggests that increasing cost-share percentage increased the probability of
a farmer accepting contract to produce Giant Miscanthus.
Producer preferences for contract attributes
Our search for contract attributes resulted in four attributes in addition to price
which had been found as important attributes which potential biorefinery firms can
consider in their quest to inducing producers to produce Giant Miscanthus (e.g. Bergtold,
Fewell, and Williams 2014). These attributes were biorefinery harvest, availability of
yield insurance to purchase, establishment cost-share, and finally contract length. One
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interesting thing that we found was that without incentives, farmers would stick with their
current crop production. This information was revealed by the estimate for the constant
which was negative and significant in most of the different models estimated though the
estimate of its standard deviation was highly significant. This indicates that some
farmers were interested in producing Giant Miscanthus in the absence of incentives. This
however was not very surprising to us since during the conduct of the survey we had
some reactions from a section of farmers from North Carolina that they believe that Giant
Miscanthus is invasive and that they were not willing to produce it not even under
contractual conditions. Even though we indicated in our survey instrument that the
variety in the study had been approved by USDA, farmers still believed that Giant
Miscanthus is an invasive specie. Findings suggest that without providing farmers with
adequate information about Giant Miscanthus and its production, a good number of
southeast farmers would not be interested in Giant Miscanthus production.
Estimation results from our analysis revealed that all contract attributes with the
exception of insurance played a significant role in motivating farmers to produce Giant
Miscanthus for biofuel purposes. Even though insurance was not significant at 5% in all
the models estimated, it was significant in some models at 10% level of statistical
significance. Biorefinery harvest, cost-share, and insurance as well as price offered per
ton all had positive effects on producers’ willingness to produce bioenergy feedstock
under contracts. Findings confirmed the importance of these attributes in the
development of the cellulosic biofuels industry. The results from all the different model
specifications found contract length as negative and significantly related to the
probability of a farmer accepting a contract to produce Giant Miscanthus. The negative
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sign associated with contract length could be due to the outside options which these
farmers have. This gives the farmer a strong renegotiation power hence farmers want
short contracts so they could have short intervals to renegotiate with the firm.
Preference heterogeneity for contract attributes
A key hypothesis the researcher tested was to identify whether there exist
preference heterogeneity in producers’ preferences for contract attributes such as
biorefinery harvest, yield insurance, contract length, and cost-share. We excluded price
from this test because we assumed that producers had statistically the same preference
parameter for price. The results as shown in the Tables 6.1 to 6.5 presented earlier
indicated that producers’ had diverse preferences for biorefinery harvest, contract length,
and insurance. Even though the researcher expected that there would not be preference
heterogeneity in producers’ preferences for in particular biorefinery harvest while going
through the comments by some survey respondents, we observed that some farmers
indicated that if they allow harvesting of Giant Miscanthus to be carried out by the
biorefinery firm, the firm may not handle it well and some farmers believed the
biorefinery firm may even destroy the younger plants. Although the majority of the
farmers had positive preference parameter for this attribute a significant number of the
farmers also associated a negative weight with this attribute. Again, although producers
overall preference for yield insurance was positive (on the average about 77% of the
respondents had positive preference parameters while the remaining 23% put negative
weights on yield insurance). Considering the role insurance could play in the
development of the bioenergy contracts or marketing, as it had been observed in other
agricultural commodities insurance programs in the U.S. and beyond, we expected that if
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not all most of the farmers would have a positive preference parameter for this attribute
since insurance can serve as a risk management tool. Even though on the whole most of
the survey respondents associated a negative weight with contract length a significant
number of farmers also preferred longer contracts. Results indicated that about 89% of
the respondents’ preferred short contract length while the remaining 11% preferred
longer contracts. Finally according to the government’s Biomass Crop Assistant Program
(BCAP), farmers who are interested in bioenergy crop productions would be offered
some form of establishment cost supports. Findings from the study revealed that there is
no preference heterogeneity in producers’ preference for this attribute. This suggests that
farmers associated a positive weight with cost-share attribute. Hence making
establishment cost-share available to farmers can entice them to produce Giant
Miscanthus.
Risk perception and risk preference on farmers’ willingness to produce Giant
Miscanthus
As demonstrated by Petrolia et al. 2015, Petrolia, Landry, and Coble 2013, Lusk
and Coble 2005, risk preference and risk perception affects an individuals’ decision. As
such, we incorporated these variables in our econometric models to determine how these
factors influenced producers’ decisions of contracting. Due to the low response rate,
estimates for these individual-specific variables were individually not significant;
however, based on our likelihood ratio tests, we found significant model improvements
when we incorporated these variables in the producer’s decision framework. The overall
improvements in the models with risk information compared to those without risk
information implies that risk preference and perception play a role in the individuals’
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decision of accepting contract to produce Giant Miscanthus. The improvements in
models suggest that our findings are consistent with economic theory. Our empirical
model could therefore be considered as an improvement in the existing framework by
Bergtold, Fewell, and Williams (2014).
Likelihood ratio test results
The log likelihood function which is a measure of goodness of fit was employed
to determine the goodness of fit of the various specifications of the Random Parameter
Logit models. Although as indicated in the Tables below, the test results revealed that
not all the models with different status-quo specifications were significantly better than
the base models (Category A models). Table 6.6 below reported results for the various
likelihood ratio tests.

Table 6.6

Likelihood ratio tests results between Categories A and B models

Model
pairs
A1 vs. B1

LR.
stat.
6.29

Crit.
value
9.49

A2 vs. B2

6.14

9.49

pvalue
0.17

0.18

Interpretation (5% level of sig.)
Failed to reject the null hypothesis that
Model B1 is not an improvement of
Model A1
Failed to reject the null hypothesis that
Model B2 is not an improvement of
Model A2

Table 6.6 above reported the result of the likelihood ratio tests between Category
A and B models. The test results suggest that we failed to reject the null hypothesis that
models B1 and B2 were not improvements of models A1 and A2 respectively, at the 5%
level of statistical significance and concluded that Category A and B models were the
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same. This indicated that specifying the utility function to capture net revenue and
variance information, holding all other factors constant did not result in significant model
improvement.
Table 6.7
Models

Likelihood ratio tests results between Categories A and C models.
LR.
stat.

Crit.
value

p-value

Interpretation (5% level of
sig.)

A1 vs. C1 16.15**

14.07

0.024

Rejected the null hypothesis
that Model C1 is not an
improvement of Model A1

A2 vs. C2 12.94

14.07

0.074

Failed to reject the null
hypothesis that Model C2 is
not an improvement of Model
A2

NOTE: **, indicates significance at 5% level of statistical significance.
Presented in Table 6.7 are the likelihood ratio test results for the comparison of
Category A and C models. The test results showed that we rejected the null hypothesis
that model C1 was not an improvement of model A1 at the 5% level of statistical
significance. We therefore concluded that there was a significant model improvement
when we introduced net revenue, variance and interaction of our 5 point scale risk
preference measure, and yield risk variables in the status-quo as opposed to assuming a
common status-quo of zero. However, it was surprising to also observe that when we
randomized all the contract attributes in addition to the constant coefficient as in the case
of models A2 and C2, we failed to reject the null hypothesis that model C2 is not an
improvement of model A2 at the 5% level of statistical significance. The possible
explanation could be that the sample size was too small.
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Table 6.8

Likelihood ratio tests results between Categories A and D models

Models

LR.
stat.

Crit.
value

pvalue

Interpretation (5% level of
sig.)

A1 vs. D1

15.68**

14.07

0.028

Rejected the null hypothesis that
Model D1 is not an
improvement of Model A1

A1 vs. D2

13.32

14.07

0.065

Failed to reject the null
hypothesis that Model D2 is not
an improvement of Model A2

NOTE: **, indicates significance at 5% level of statistical significance.
Furthermore, we also employed the log-likelihood ratio test to identify whether
there exists a significant model improvement when status-quo utility was specified using
net revenue, variance, our 3 point scale risk preference information as well as information
about how farmers perceived yield risk of Giant Miscanthus relative to the crop they were
willing to substitute with Giant Miscanthus. The test results as reported in Table 6.8
indicated that in the simple RPL models (i.e. A1 and D1) we rejected the null hypothesis
that model D1 was not an improvement of model A1 and concluded that model D1 was
an improved version of model A1 at the 5% statistical level of significance. However, in
the RPL models with all random contract attribute coefficients, we failed to reject the null
hypothesis that model D2 was not an improvement of model A2.
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Table 6.9
Models

Likelihood ratio tests results between Categories A and E models
Crit.
value
9.49

pvalue
0.11

Interpretation (5% level of sig.)

A1 vs. E1

LR.
stat.
7.51

A2 vs. E2

6.56

9.49

0.16

Failed to reject the null
hypothesis that Model E2 is not
an improvement of Model A2

Failed to reject the null
hypothesis that Model E1 is not
an improvement of Model A1

Finally we compared Category A models with Category E models. The test
results as shown in Table 6.9 suggested that incorporating net revenue, certainty
equivalent (a risk preference measure) as well as farmers’ perception about yield risk of
Giant Miscanthus relative to their own crop production did not result in a significant
model improvement compared to a model without these variables. The results suggest
that we failed to reject the null hypothesis that models E1 and E2 are not improvement of
models A1 and A2 respectively and concluded that models E1 and E2 were no better than
models A1 and A2.
Welfare estimates
WTA values for contract attributes
Using the Delta method with 25000 random draws following Bliemer and Rose
(2013), we calculated the mean and confidence intervals of willingness to accept values
associated with contract attributes in all the RPL models with random contract attributes
(i.e. models A2, B2, C2, D2, E2). The results are reported in the Tables below, starting
with model A2 through to model E5. We found that the mean WTA for all the contract
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attributes did not differ much across the different models. It should be emphasized again
that all the models had different status-quo. Contract attributes with positive mean WTA
suggest that the amount which a farmer has to be compensated is reduced when a contract
is offered with such attribute(s) included. For instance mean WTA for biorefinery
harvest of $28.98 suggests that for a contract with a biorefinery harvest component, the
amount which has to be offered to the farmer in order to get him to accept the contract is
reduced by $28.98, ceteris paribus. Another interpretation for this is that availability of
biorefinery harvest adds on the average $28.98 to the overall value of the contract. Also
for a contract which has yield insurance available for farmers to purchase, assuming the
returns from Giant Miscanthus and for instance corn production are equal, to get a corn
farmer to accept Giant Miscanthus contract, the firm has to offer the farmer a premium
to get him or her accept the contract. However, the presence of insurance reduces this
premium amount by about $6.21. Furthermore holding all other factors constant, a year
increase in contract duration is associated with a compensation of about $3.40 to get a
farmer to accept the contract. Finally a 10% increase in establishment cost-share reduces
the amount which a farmer has to be offered by about $3.40.
Tables 6.10 and 6.11 below report the mean WTA and confidence intervals
associated with the various contract attributes. Aside the confidence intervals which had
wide ranges, we also observed that there are variations in these confidence intervals
across the different models. The larger ranges associated with the confidence intervals
could be due to the sample size, which has been emphasized as very small. This suggests
that the confidence intervals reported here are only reflections of our data.
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Table 6.10

Mean WTA and confidence intervals of contract attributes

Attribute

Mean WTA ($)
(Confidence interval)
Model B2

Model A2

Model C2

Biorefinery harvest

28.98

(-167.46)
(225.45)

28.93

(-168.66)
( 226.51)

28.75

(-204.51)
(262. 01)

Insurance

6.21

(-116.71)
(128.57)

6.27

(-110.71)
(122.91)

6.53

(-108.64)
(121.67)

Contract length

-2.89

(-30.40)
(24.60)

-2.94

(-28.29)
(22.41)

-2.87

(-30.66)
(24.93)

Cost-share

0.34

(-2.52)
(3.21)

0.33

(-2.36)
(3.02)

0.35

(-2.27)
(2.96)

NOTE: Confidence interval is in parenthesis.
Table 6.11

Mean WTA and confidence intervals of contract attributes

Attribute

WTA ($)
(Confidence interval)
Model D2

Model E2

Biorefinery
harvest

28.98

(-203.48)
( 225.43)

28.25

(-171.86)
(228.37)

Insurance

6.51

(-116.37)
(129.38)

6.16

(-104.55)
(116.87)

Contract length

-2.73

(-28.92)
(23.46)

-2.94

(-28.74)
(22.86)

Cost-share

0.33

(-2.51)
(3.17)

0.33

(-2.15)
(2.81)

Note: Confidence interval is in parenthesis.
After calculating the mean willingness to accept (WTA) estimates for the
individual contract attributes, we as well derived the overall amount which the
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biorefinery firm has to offer a farmer to get him / her switch from his current crop
production to the production of Giant Miscanthus under contracts assuming the returns
from Giant Miscanthus and that of the farmer’s current crop production are equal. We
emphasize that the overall WTA is scenario specific. For example, if a firm was offering
Giant Miscanthus contract which would last for 5-years, with biorefinery harvest, with
insurance available for farmers to purchase, and with a 50% cost-share, then the firm had
to offer the farmer a premium of $32.23 in order to get the farmer to switch from his
current crop production say corn to the production of Giant Miscanthus. This contract
considering the attribute and the levels of the attributes, it can be considered as a good
contract. This minimum compensation amount of $32.23 is lower than the breakeven
price of $41-$58 reported by Khanna et al. (2008) and the $88 reported by Vyn, Virani,
and Deen (2012) for Giant Miscanthus produced in Ontario, Canada.
Another example is that if a firm was offering Giant Miscanthus contract which
would last for 13 years, with no biorefinery harvest, no insurance available for farmers to
purchase, and 0% cost-share, then the firm had to offer the farmer about $107.63
premium in order to get the farmer to switch from his current crop production say corn to
the production of Giant Miscanthus. Table 6.12 provides some scenario specific or
overall amount that a farmer has to be compensated or offered in order to get him to
switch from his current crop production to the production of Giant Miscanthus under
contract.
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Table 6.12

Overall WTA

Scenario

WTA ($)

95% Conf. interval

5- year contract with / biorefinery harvest /
insurance / 50% cost-share

-32.23

-166.57

102.12

9- year contract with / biorefinery harvest /no
insurance / 25% cost-share

-58.54

-196.19

76.12

5- year contract with / no biorefinery harvest /
no insurance / no cost-share

-83.43

-196.16

89.29

13- year contract with / biorefinery harvest / no -92.92
insurance / 25% cost-share

-221.67

55.83

13- year contract with / no harvest / no
insurance / no cost-share

-249.63

34.36

-107.63

2

2

The negative overall willingness to accept (WTA) amounts as reported in the Table
suggests that to induce a farmer to accept a specific contract scenario, the firm has to
offer a premium which corresponds to the specific scenario.
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research examined southeast U.S. farmers’ preferences for contracts to
produce Giant Miscanthus for biofuel purposes. Specifically, we sought to identify
which contract attributes affected potential farmers’ willingness to accept a contract to
produce Giant Miscanthus. The attributes considered in our analysis were price offered
per ton, yield insurance availability, contract length in years, establishment cost-share,
and biorefinery harvest. Additionally, we incorporated risk information, specifically
information on risk perceptions and risk preferences in our analysis to improve upon the
framework which existed for modeling producer decisions of accepting bioenergy
contracts.
Our unique contribution to the literature was the provision of a stronger
conceptual framework for modeling producer decisions of accepting contracts to produce
risky bioenergy crops. The study also contributed to the literature by accounting for
heterogeneity in the current (status-quo) crop and the associated mean and variance of
revenue. Although the attributes considered in our study had been previously identified
as important attributes that biorefinery firms could consider, little was known about
preference heterogeneity for these attributes, hence our study adopted a random –
coefficients model which allowed us to test the existence of preference heterogeneity for
contract attributes. Finally the study provided estimates of incremental values of
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inclusion of biorefinery harvest, insurance, increased contract length, and cost-share on
biofuel contracts.
Conclusions
Results indicated that higher contract prices, inclusion of bio-refinery harvest, and
increased establishment cost-share significantly increased the probability of a producer
accepting a Giant Miscanthus contract. Increased contract length had a significant
negative effect on the probability of contract acceptance. This finding suggests that
producers preferred shorter contracts. Furthermore, results indicated that availability of
insurance did not have a significant effect on the probability of contract acceptance.
We also found evidence of preference heterogeneity in producers’ preferences for
insurance, contract length, and bio-refinery harvest. This suggests that farmers had
diverse preferences over these attributes. For instance, 77% of the estimated respondent
– specific coefficients for insurance were positive, implying that this proportion of
farmers were more likely to accept a Gaint Miscanthus contract in the presence of
insurance, whereas 23% were less likely. Similarly, estimated 89 % of respondents
preferred short contracts, while 11% preferred longer contract lengths.
Results from our estimations also revealed that risk preferences and risk
perceptions influenced the probability of a farmer accepting contracts. Though due to our
small sample size we did not find individual coefficients significant, our likelihood ratio
test results indicated there was overall model improvement when these variables were
incorporated in our models.
We found that accounting for heterogeneity in status-quo (i.e. differences in their
current crop production and returns) resulted in significant model improvement. This
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suggests that a failure to account for these differences could bias results which could lead
to misleading conclusions. Although our analysis did not find any of these variables or
their interactions as individually significant, overall model fit was improved based on our
likelihood ratio tests. We attributed the lack of individual significance to our small
sample size.
Based on our overall welfare estimates, i.e., contract values, we found that, for
instance, a 13- year Giant Miscanthus contract, with no biorefinery harvest, no insurance,
and no establishment cost-share, required a premium of $108 over and above the farmer’s
current crop’s mean returns to induce a switch to Giant Miscanthus. However, the
inclusion of biorefinery harvest, insurance, as well as establishment cost-share
substantially reduced this premium. For instance a 5-year contract with biorefinery
harvest, insurance, and cost-share required a premium of $32 to get a farmer switch from
his current crop to the production of Giant Miscanthus.
Limitations
The study had some limitations which gives directions for future studies. A major
limitation of the study was the small sample size. Even with the addition of an incentive
– a $25 Walmart gift certificate, we had very limited responses. We also asked questions
in our survey instrument which were not included in our econometric model. For
instance, we asked questions about how farmers perceive the price risk of Giant
Miscanthus relative to their current crop production, farmers’ expectations of interest
rates, and so on. Inclusion of these additional questions increased the time that farmers
had to spend taking the survey, which may have contributed to low response rate. Future
studies should make it known to respondents from the onset and also should try to keep
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the survey as short as possible and if possible focus only on the variables of direct
interest. Furthermore, although our study provided evidence that the majority of farmers
preferred biorefinery harvest, insurance, shorter contract lengths, as well as higher initial
establishment cost-share, we did not investigate why farmers had these preferences. For
instance we did not find out why a majority of the farmers preferred shorter contract
lengths.
In addition, as indicated above, we found evidence of preference heterogeneity in
producers’ preferences for biorefinery harvest, insurance, and contract length. However
we did not investigate why there existed preference heterogeneity hence future research
could investigate why farmers had diverse preferences for biorefinery harvest, insurance,
and contract length.
Lastly, although our likelihood ratio tests revealed overall model improvement
when we accounted for heterogeneity in farmer status-quo by using net revenue and
variance information, we however, did not find individual significance due to our small
sample size. Future research could further investigate this by collecting enough data to
find out whether these variables would be individually significant.
Implications
Despite the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007’s mandate of
producing 9 billion gallons of advanced biofuels annually by the year 2017, 15 billion
gallons by 2020, and 21 billion gallons by 2022, there still remains a major technological
challenge in the process involved in the conversion of lignocellulose biomass to the final
biofuel (Hoekman 2009). This continues to hamper the development of markets to
absorb cellulosic feedstocks thereby hindering EISA’s mandate.
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The first commercial plant for the conversion of lignocellulosic biomass through
thermochemical means was the KiOR oil plant in Columbus Mississippi (Milbrandt,
Kinchin, and McCormick 2013). KiOR’s mandate was to utilize non-food based
feedstocks including biomass such as pulp logs, agricultural residues, and energy crops
such as switchgrass and sorghum to produce diesel and gasoline blendstocks (KiOR
2015).
With the recent shutdown of the KiOR plant, however, would-be bioenergy
feedstock producers in the region are now aware of this major setback in the biofuel
industry, pointing to the fact that farmers would likely not produce or supply these
feedstocks. This gives an indication that the development of the biofuel industry in the
U.S. will continue to face major challenges if appropriate measures and technological
breakthroughs are not met.
Additionally, the higher premium as indicated by our results to induce farmers to
switch from their current crop production to the production of cellulosic feedstocks
implies that meeting EISA’s yearly mandates still remains a major problem.
Although development of the advanced biofuel industry as it stands now does not
look very promising, the continued search for appropriate technologies for converting
biomass to the final biofuel as well as the continue provision of funding by NIFA to
support research geared towards the advancement of the industry gives hope that the
industry can see light despite the major constraints it is encountering.

73

REFERENCES
Aguilar, F. X., & Thompson, W. (2010). Charging into the blend wall: Conjoint analysis
of consumer willingness to pay for ethanol blend fuels. In 2010 Annual Meeting,
July 25-27, Denver, CO. Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
Alfnes, F., Guttormsen, A. G., Steine, G., & Kolstad, K. (2006). Consumers' willingness
to pay for the color of salmon: A choice experiment with real economic
incentives. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 88(4), 1050-1061.
Altman, I., & Sanders, D. (2012). Producer willingness and ability to supply biomass:
Evidence from the US Midwest. Biomass and Bioenergy, 36, 176-181.
Bangsund, D. A., DeVuyst, E. A., & Leistritz, F. L. (2008). Evaluation of breakeven
farm-gate switchgrass prices in south central North Dakota (No. 37845). North
Dakota State University, Department of Agribusiness and Applied Economics.
Bergtold, J. S., Fewell, J., & Williams, J. (2014). Farmers’ willingness to produce
alternative cellulosic biofuel feedstocks under contract in Kansas using stated
choice experiments. BioEnergy Research, 7(3), 876-884.
Bliemer, M. C., & Rose, J. M. (2013). Confidence intervals of willingness-to-pay for
random coefficient logit models. Transportation Research Part B:
Methodological, 58, 199-214.
Bliemer, M. C., & Rose, J. M. (2011). Experimental design influences on stated choice
outputs: An empirical study in air travel choice. Transportation Research Part A:
Policy and Practice, 45(1), 63-79.
Bliemer, M. C., & Rose, J. M. (2010). Construction of experimental designs for mixed
logit models allowing for correlation across choice observations. Transportation
Research Part B: Methodological, 44(6), 720-734.
Brown, S. P., & Huntington, H. G. (2013). Assessing the US oil security premium.
Energy Economics, 38, 118-127.
Bruce, A. B, Gassman, P. W., Jha, M. & Kling, C. L. (2007). Adoption subsidies and
environmental impacts of alternative energy crops: Iowa State University. Center
for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Briefing Paper.

74

Carson, R. T., & Czajkowski, M. (2013). A new baseline model for estimating
willingness to pay from discrete choice models. In International choice modelling
conference, Sydney.
Cushing, C., & Cushing, B. (2007). Conditional Logit, IIA, and Alternatives for
Estimating Models of Interstate Migration. In 2007 Annual Meeting, March 29-3,
Charleston, SC. Southern Regional Science Association.
De La Torre Ugarte, G., English, B. C., & Jensen, K. (2007). Sixty billion gallons by
2030: Economic and agricultural impacts of ethanol and biodiesel expansion.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 89(5), 1290-1295.
Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
Gedikoglu, H. (2012). Impact of Off-Farm Employment on Farmers’ Willingness to
Grow Switchgrass and Miscanthus. In 2012 Annual Meeting, February 4-7,
Birmingham, AL. Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
Greene, W. H. (2012). Econometric Analysis, Upper Saddle River, NJ. Prentice Hall.
Hamilton, J. D. (2008). Understanding crude oil prices (No. w14492). National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Hanemann, W. M. (1984). Discrete / continuous models of consumer demand.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 541-561.
Hanley, N., Mourato, S., & Wright, R. E. (2001). Choice Modelling Approaches: A
Superior Alternative for Environmental Valuation? Journal of economic surveys,
15(3), 435-462.
Heaton, E., K. Moore, M. Salas-Fernandez, B. Hartzler, M. Liebman, & Barnhart S.
(2010). Giant Miscanthus for Biomass Production. Factsheet.
http://www.extension.iastate.edu/publications/ag201.pdf.
Heaton, E. A., Dohleman, F. G., & Long, S. P. (2008). Meeting US biofuel goals with
less land: The potential of Miscanthus. Global Change Biology, 14(9), 2000-2014.
Heaton, E., Voigt, T., & Long, S. P. (2004). A quantitative review comparing the yields
of two candidate C4 perennial biomass crops in relation to nitrogen, temperature
and water. Biomass and bioenergy, 27(1), 21-30.
Hoekman, S. K. (2009). Biofuels in the US–challenges and opportunities. Renewable
Energy, 34(1), 14-22.
Jensen, K., Clark, C. D., Ellis, P., English, B., Menard, J., Walsh, M., & De La Torre
Ugarte, D. (2007). Farmer willingness to grow switchgrass for energy
production. Biomass and Bioenergy, 31(11), 773-781.
75

Jensen, K. L., Clark, C. D., English, B. C., Menard, R. J., Skahan, D. K., & Marra, A. C.
(2010). Willingness to pay for E85 from corn, switchgrass, and wood
residues. Energy Economics, 32(6), 1253-1262.
Khanna, M. (2008). Cellulosic biofuels: Are they economically viable and
environmentally sustainable? Choices, 23(3), 16-21.
Khanna, M., Dhungana, B., & Clifton-Brown, J. (2008). Costs of producing miscanthus
and switchgrass for bioenergy in Illinois. Biomass and Bioenergy, 32(6), 482-493.
KiOR (2015). http://www.kior.com/content/?s=29&s2=66&p=66&t=FeedstockFlexibility
Kuhfeld, W. F. (2005). Experimental design, efficiency, coding, and choice designs.
Marketing research methods in sas: Experimental design, choice, conjoint, and
graphical techniques, 47-97.
LeBlanc, M., & Chinn, M. D. (2004). Do high oil prices presage inflation? The evidence
from G-5 countries. UC Santa Cruz Economics Working Paper, (561), 04-04.
Li, T., & McCluskey, J. J. (2014). Consumer Preferences for Second-Generation
Bioethanol. In 2014 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, Minneapolis, MN. Agricultural
and Applied Economics Association.
Lusk, J. L., & Coble, K. H. (2005). Risk perceptions, risk preference, and acceptance of
risky food. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87(2), 393-405.
Lynes, M. K., Bergtold, J. S., Williams, J. R., & Fewell, J. E. (2012). Determining
Farmers’ Willingness-To-Grow Cellulosic Biofuel Feedstocks on Agricultural
Land. In 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, Seattle, WA. Agricultural and
Applied Economics Association.
McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In:
Zarembka, P. (Ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics. New York, Academic Press.
McLaughlin, S. B., De La Torre Ugarte, D. G., Garten, C. T., Lynd, L. R., Sanderson, M.
A., Tolbert, V. R., & Wolf, D. D. (2002). High-value renewable energy from
prairie grasses. Environmental Science & Technology, 36(10), 2122-2129.
Mercadé, L., Gil, J. M., Kallas, Z., & Serra, J. (2009). A choice experiment method to
assess vegetables producers’ preferences for crop insurance. In 2009 Seminar,
September 3-6, Chania, Crete, Greece. European Association of Agricultural
Economists.
Milbrandt, A., Kinchin, C., & McCormick, R. (2013). The Feasibility of Producing and
Using Biomass-Based Diesel and Jet Fuel in the United States. Contract, 303, 275
– 300.
76

Mitchell, R., & Carson R.T. (1989). Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The
Contingent Valuation Method. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Mogas, J., Riera, P., & Bennett, J. (2006). A comparison of contingent valuation and
choice modelling with second-order interactions. Journal of Forest
Economics, 12(1), 5-30.
Moore, R. (2008). Using attitudes to characterize heterogeneous preferences. In 2008
Annual Meeting, July 27 – 29, Orlando, FL. American Agricultural Economics
Association.
MSU Extension Service (2012). http://msucares.com/news/releases/12/120301free.html
Okwo, A., & Thomas, V. M. (2014). Biomass feedstock contracts: Role of land quality
and yield variability in near term feasibility. Energy Economics, 42, 67-80.
Perrin, R., Vogel, K., Schmer, M., & Mitchell, R. (2008). Farm-scale production cost of
switchgrass for biomass. BioEnergy Research, 1(1), 91-97.
Petrolia, D. R. (2006). Ethanol from biomass: Economic and environmental potential of
converting corn stover and hardwood forest residue in Minnesota. In 2006 Annual
Meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA. American Agricultural Economics
Association.
Petrolia, D. R. (2008a). An analysis of the relationship between demand for corn stover
as an ethanol feedstock and soil erosion. Applied Economic Perspectives and
Policy, 30(4), 677-691.
Petrolia, D. R. (2008b). The economics of harvesting and transporting corn stover for
conversion to fuel ethanol: A case study for Minnesota. Biomass and Bioenergy,
32(7), 603-612.
Petrolia, D. R., Bhattacharjee, S., Hudson, D., & Herndon, C. W. (2010). Do Americans
want ethanol? A comparative contingent-valuation study of willingness to pay for
E-10 and E-85. Energy Economics, 32(1), 121-128.
Petrolia, D. R., Hwang J, Landry C. E. & Coble K. H. (2015). Wind Insurance and
Mitigation in the Coastal Zone. Land Economics, 91(2), 272-295.
Petrolia, D. R., Landry, C. E., & Coble, K. H. (2013). Risk preferences, risk perceptions,
and flood insurance. Land Economics, 89(2), 227-245.
Qualls, D. J., Jensen, K. L., Clark, C. D., English, B. C., Larson, J. A., & Yen, S. T.
(2012). Analysis of factors affecting willingness to produce switchgrass in the
southeastern United States. Biomass and Bioenergy, 39, 159-167.
Qualtrics Labs Inc. (2014). http://www.qualtrics.com
77

Roe, B., Sporleder, T. L., & Belleville, B. (2004). Hog producer preferences for
marketing contract attributes. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
86(1), 115-123.
Runge, C. F., & Senauer, B. (2007). How biofuels could starve the poor. Foreign Affairs,
41-53.
Sargent T. (1987), Macroeconomic Theory, 2nd edition cited in Yossi Spiegel (2013-14)
Handout. http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel/teaching/corpfin/mean-variance.pdf
Sherrington, C., Bartley, J., & Moran, D. (2008). Farm-level constraints on the domestic
supply of perennial energy crops in the UK. Energy Policy, 36(7), 2504-2512.
Skahan, D. A. (2010). Consumer Willingness to Pay for E85. M.S. Thesis. University of
Tennessee – Knoxville. http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_gradthes/749/
Solomon, B. D., & Johnson, N. H. (2009). Valuing climate protection through
willingness to pay for biomass ethanol. Ecological Economics, 68(7), 2137-2144.
Song, F., Zhao, J., & Swinton, S. M. (2011). Switching to perennial energy crops under
uncertainty and costly reversibility. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics, 93(3), 768-783.
Train, K. E. (2009). Discrete choice methods with simulation. New York, Cambridge
university press.
Ulmer, J. D., Huhnke, R. L., Bellmer, D. D., & Cartmell, D. D. (2004). Acceptance of
ethanol-blended gasoline in Oklahoma. Biomass and Bioenergy, 27(5), 437-444.
USDA-NASS (2012). Census of Agriculture
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapte
r_1_US/usv1.pdf
Vyn, R. J., Virani, T., & Deen, B. (2012). Examining the economic feasibility of
miscanthus in Ontario: An application to the greenhouse industry. Energy
Policy, 50, 669-676.

78

APPENDIX A
SAMPLE ONLINE SURVEY

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

89

90

91

92

93

94

